CPSI WP 4.4 Culture Analysis

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Report on Cultural Issues

- CPSI WP 4.4 work is dedicated to the other part of validation and data collection, applying a macroanalytical approach (performed on two levels: the government or public policy level and the citizen level) and developing a framework for assessing national security cultures.

- The report centres on cultural factors in changing perceptions of security and interventions and in (dis)associations between felt and actual security. It develops and applies a qualitative analytical framework to identify and make comparable the cognitive foundations for a society's knowledge management and attitudes in respect of security issues.

Design

- Cultural analysis in the report is based on a cognitive concept of culture that is applied to two levels of aggregation: the citizen level (focusing on perceptions of security/insecurity) and the government level (focusing on security-enhancing interventions).

- The report investigates assessments of pre-existing worldviews, styles of perception and standard operating procedures that guide public security/security threat perceptions, as well as the efficiency perception of technology-based security solutions.

- It is among the objectives of the analysis to identify types of citizen security cultures on a comparative basis, based on a secondary analysis of social and victimological survey data which have not been looked at in a comprehensive way before. Rather, cultural accounts have concentrated on identifying stylized frameworks and cultural space for dealing with citizen security.

Security policy culture (1/2): 4 Big Factors Model

	Culture as a factor in the perception/definition of threat	Culture as a factor in the response to threat
Cultural factors influencing the thematic thrust of national security research programmes (e.g. prevention/preparedness vs. reaction/response; technology)	***Knowledge and interpretation*** Shared understanding of the concept of security; cognitive construction of a common European security space; overcoming traditional interpretations and courses of action through common knowledge	***Action repertories*** Reduction of complexity to available strategies; attempt to make national strategies international standards; divergent national responses to same structural pressures; problem of harmonization of national implementation actions
Cultural factors influencing the national approach to security (research) governance (e.g. national inter-agency coordination vs. international standardization)	***Common symbols*** Ideas and habits defining national characteristics of security and governing threat perception	***Normative values*** Institutional foundations that provide values on which decision-making is based; problem of the development of a common European security identity along with standardization and certification of security solutions

Security policy culture (2/2): Indicators by countries, based on national security (research) strategy papers

|	Austria	France	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	Norway	Sweden	Spain	UK
Normative values	"comprehensive national defence" as a tradition and legal provision	Sûreté tradition supports a balance between internal and international dimension	Technical understanding of security and culture of security centred on the norm of preserving state functioning and protecting market economy	Political norm of comprehensive risk assessment and management	Normative conviction that security is an anti-societal affair and must rest on contributions from the national government, local governments, the business community, social organizations and citizens.	Culture of security (prevention) in the sector of critical information and communication technology is a leading value for security (research) policy making	Establishing international linkages, but mainly in order to support industry participation in foreign (mainly U.S.) security research programmes	Normative idea of national innovation by dedicating research to cross-cutting themes	Inter-agency joined-up approach is a normative value, based on experience with administration in commonwealth and multiculturalism affairs
Knowledge & interpetation	Common practice of consocialism and consensus democracy increases potential for pluralistic analysis	Sûreté tradition causes on overemphasis on societal (as opposed to the technical) dimension	Academic approach to security research, centred on the technological science dimension, limits thematic scope	Cognitive approach directed at comprehensive risk information and assessment, involving inter-national import and ex-port of scientific (technological) knowledge	Security interpreted as a task on the level of the state organization as a whole, including societal stakeholders	Security commonly interpreted as information security	National security (research) is understood as an instrument for improving conditions for participating in the EUs security research programme	Security (research) mainly interpreted in terms of science and technology	Combating terrorism is interpreted as a comprehensive task, including politics, public, technology, applied sciences and academia
Common symbols	Security is seen as a national symbol	Security as a national symbol	Security as a symbol for crisis management in a broad sense, independent from the source of origin	Security as defence (Cold-war front state threat from outside and extremist threat from within)	Internal security and public safety as a national task, at the same time political culture is open towards an Europeanization of the security sector due to long experience with inter-nation-ally acting organized crime	Critical information and communication infrastructure as a cultural symbol of national security		Very different concepts of security with different connotations (Franco's repressive security state in charge of public order hinders a streamlining)	Homeland security symbolism favours science and techno-logy cooperation and critical infrastructure protection
Action repertories	Common practice of consocialism and consensus democracy increases potential for national coordination	Practice of involve-ment mechanisms in international mechanisms as an opportunity to develop knowledge of global trends/approaches	Practice of civil protection practices on Bundeslander level	Cold war front state legacy leads to an over-emphasis of civil protection practices	Practical concern with organized crime promotes electronic surveillance/concen-tration on techno-logical solutions	Nurturing a culture of security in the sector of critical information and communication technology	Practice of networking, establishment of international security networks and deems the national approach to be aligned of that of other nations and organizations		Commonwealth tradition facilitates sharing of experience and solutions with international partners

Citizen Security Culture

	AT	BG	DE	FR	IT	NL	SE	UK
Tentative typology of citizen security culture	Realistic fear of crime Social fear culture	Overfear Personal fear culture	Underfear Balanced personal/social fear culture	Overfear Balanced personal/social fear culture	(scattered; in sum close to realistic fear of crime) Personal fear culture	Between underfear and realistic fear of crime Social fear of crime culture	Unbalanced Social fear of crime culture	Underfear Balanced personal/social fear culture
Victimization	-	0	0	-	0	+	0	+
Over/under-average offences per 100.000 population	0	-	0	-	-	+	+	+
Personal fear of crime level	-	+	-	0	+	-	-	0
Personal fear : victimization	0	n/a	-	+	+	-	-	-
Social fear of crime level	0	0	-	0	-	+	+	0
Social fear : victimization	+	n/a	-	+	-	0	+	-
Relationship between felt societal security and felt personal security level	social > personal	n/a	social = personal	social = personal	social < personal	social > personal	social > personal	social = personal
Public debates centred on … security	perceived	actual	perceived	actual	n/a	n/a	n/a	actual
Policy interventions based on … security	actual	perceived	perceived	perceived	n/a	n/a	n/a	actual
CCTV acceptance	-	n/a	0	-	+	n/a	n/a	+
Technology as threat/ source of insecurity or as a solution (line 10)	Threat		Solution	Threat	Solution	Threat	Solution	Solution

Indicative Results (1/2)

- Citizens' knowledge is a key factor for their perception of security and interventions.

- Knowledge also mediates between felt and actual security. This highlights the need for continued interpretation of security as an information and cognition issue.

- While cultural factors have a positive impact on solutions to security problems when these are perceived by the public as national problems, the EU must minimize its negative impact on solutions to security problems when these are perceived by the public as 'European problems'.

- Knowledge is a first-rank effectiveness criteria for security-enhancing interventions.

Indicative Results (2/2)

- Strong knowledge and interpretative contexts present on the national level are a cultural factor that decreases citizens' individual perception of insecurity:

  - Social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime
  - Actual insecurity particularly increases social fear of crime (perception of crime as a problem "out there") but decreases personal fear of crime (perception of crime as an individual concern).

Social fear of crime

Actual insecurity

Personal fear of crime

Culture and Interventions (1/2)

- Interventions should in the first place focus on a comprehensive definition or articulation of risk based on exchange of knowledge.

- Policy interventions based on perceived security have been found to increase citizens' fear of crime.

- Cultural factors have a positive impact on solutions to security problems when these are perceived by the public as national problems

- Cultural factors have a negative impact on solutions to security problems when these are perceived by the public as 'European problems'.

Culture and Interventions (2/2)

- Cultural contexts of communication-based interventions:

    - Risk communication needs to support citizens' search for security under a condition of absence of reliable information. Public communication therefore must provide relevant information that helps citizens to reactivate their earlier experience with risk and crisis.

    - In countries with a social fear of crime culture, communication-based interventions typically lower citizens perception of (in)security, and this type of gap between actual and perceived security is mainly due to styles of social meaning making as rooted in the social context.

    - In countries with a personal fear of crime culture, communication-based interventions typically increase citizens perception of (in)security, and this type of gap between actual and perceived security is mainly attributable to disproportionate media reporting.

WP Interrelations

- Results covered in the present report will feed into elaborated country case studies within further work under CPSI WP 4.4 also considering upcoming findings from WP 2.3.

- CPSI WP 4.4 research results and data will inform CPSI WP 5.2 (qualitative analysis), which includes a morphological model comparing a number of national security trends for different EU countries, based on data from a national typology of citizen security developed by WP 4.4 (cultural analysis).

- CPSI WP 4.4 empirical cultural data and derived hypotheses can serve as material for external validation purposes within other WP 4 tasks and sub-packages.